In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric information about the enforcer's agent's costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem a ects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a tradeo between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more o enses being committed.
Introduction
Most models of law enforcement, since Becker 1968 , assume symmetric information between government and enforcers. That corresponds to an ideal public law enforcement context as described by Landes and Posner 1975 . Becker and Stigler 1974 have argued that private enforcement might be advantageous because public enforcement creates incentives to bribery which undermine deterrence. Landes and Posner 1975 have proposed that public enforcement may besuperior to private enforcement in many contexts, because precisely public enforcers can more easily enforce the combination of high nes and low probabilities of detection which Becker 1968 showed to be optimal. The discussion between private and public enforcement has been followed up by Friedman 1984 , Shavell 1993 and Garoupa and Klerman 1999 .
Asymmetry of information between the government and a public enforcer and its impact of the cost structure of enforcement has not been discussed in the literature. Polinsky 1980 rst attended at the cost structure of enforcement. He has shown that a problem with private agents is that by increasing the likelihood of punishment, the poolof o enders is reduced making the enforcement less pro table. Consequently, private enforcers have an incentive to manipulate apprehension and detection so that there is a su ciently pro table pool of o enders. Garoupa 1997b made additional improvement b y considering the possibility o f t ype I error that is, convicting the innocent, and showing that private agencies have also a clear incentive to commit type I errors to boost revenues undermining criminal deterrence. Such remarks make public enforcement more attractive.
Realistically, public enforcement is not decided by a single actor, but by di erent agents, in particular, public enforcers and a government. An enforcement agency is more likely to have a comparative advantage in enforcement detection and investigation than the government. Through its operating activities, the agency obtains private information; information that is not available to the government the principal. This information symmetry poses a serious problem of implementing an optimal enforcement policy within the public enforcement model. In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric information about the enforcer's agent's costs associated to enforcement expenditure. Hence this is an adverse selection problem in the jargon of incentive theory. The enforcement cost depend on several factors related to the nature of the crime and known to the enforcer the agent but only imperfectly observed by the principal assumed to be a benevolent government. Therefore, a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given an economic compensation -information rent-to be induced to reveal its true costs. The problem to be analyzed is the design of optimal incentives to o er to the enforcer agency of enforcement in order to secure participation with adequate compensation.
This approach is more directly related to the public sector literature that as often characterize the public sector as ine cient due to the objectives pursued by decision makers within di erent branches of government. Niskanen 1994 has developed a model of public sector that assumed budget maximizing bureaus, information asymmetry between bureau and the funding source, and the granting of monopoly power to the bureaus by the funding authority. Under these conditions, it can beshown that the public sector produces at a level where the social marginal cost exceeds the marginal bene t.
Our rst contribution to the theory of optimal law enforcement is the consideration of an opportunity cost in using public funds to enforce the law. The optimal sanction is di erent from the usual solution, that is, the harm caused by the o ense in ated by the probability of apprehension and punishment the so-called multiplier principle. Furthermore, the di erence between the optimal sanction and the multiplier principle increases with the opportunity cost of raising public funds.
Under asymmetric information, an information rent must beborne by the government and paid to the enforcer. The government faces a tradeo between minimizing the enforcer's rent and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more o enses being committed.
The information rent is essentially a transfer from the government to the public enforcer. In the usual utilitarian context, the optimal policy is neutral to such redistribution. Asymmetry of information does not a ect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers and the crime rate.
Law Enforcement
We introduce a general function for global costs, Cx; p, where x is an intrinsic cost parameter, and p is the probability of detection and conviction. The cost parameter is determined by the agency's technology and its private knowledge. The support x 2 x; x and the distribution Gx are common knowledge. We make the following assumptions:
A. 1 Monotonicity @ C x; p=@x 0
The condition of monotonicity reduces the set of participation constraints to a single constraint, hence meaning that x is the most and x is the least cost e ective. The last two assumptions are su cient conditions for the principal's optimization problem.
A. 2 Single Crossing Property

A. 6 Monotone Hazard Rate d Gx=gx =dx 0
The monotone hazard rate where g: is the density is satis ed by most standard distributions. 1 This property c haracterizes G: as log concave and can beinterpreted as a decreasing returns assumption. 2 
Enforcement under Symmetric Information
In the case of symmetric information, the government the principal knows the cost parameter, and maximizes social welfare given by the following sum of utility of o enders and non-o enders plus the agency's utility. In the optimal law enforcement literature, social welfare generally equals the sum of individuals' expected utilities minus the harm caused by o enses minus expenditure on law enforcement 3 Following La ont and Tirole 1993, a possible interpretation is that the basic technology, known to everyone, is characterized by
x. There can be improvements on this technology. The expression x , x is a measure of the numb e r o f s u c h improvements. Gx is the probability that there are at least x , x improvements. The probability that there are more than x , x improvements and less than x , x + dx improvements is gxdx.
Thus when decreasing to x from x, gx=Gx is the conditional probability that there are no more improvements given that there have been already
x , x improvements. The monotone hazard rate states that this conditional probability increases as the rm becomes more e cient.
The principal maximizes W p; s in the probability p and severity s subject to the individual rationality constraint agency's participation constraint where we normalize the opportunity level of utility to zero: tx , Cx; p 0. Since transfers are costly 0, under symmetric information tx will be set such that the participation constraint will be binding for all types at the optimum. As a consequence, we can write tx = C x; px for all x 2 = x ;
x . 4 The principal's problem is to maximize in p and s: Note that for 0 there is a new term given by @ C x; p=@p = S f p S which represents social cost since transfers are costly because they induce distortions elsewhere in terms of taxation, administrative costs in other productive sectors.
The interpretation of the optimal policy is standard: the marginal bene t from deterrence in terms of avoided harm equals the social marginal cost adjusted to deterring crime adjusted because de ated by S f : plus the expected sanction. As a consequence p xS h , that is, at the optimum 4 We have assumed that the revenues from punishing individuals given by R 1 pxs pxsdF b are distributed lump-sum. The results we present here are robust to a di erent speci cation that includes explicitly the revenues from punishing o enders.
there is underdeterrence in the sense that the expected punishment borne by the o ender is less than the harm borne by the victim.
Enforcement under Asymmetric Information
Now, the enforcer agent is assumed to know her his own type x. The government is unable to observe the type, but knows the range x 2 =
x;
x and the distribution of types, given by the probability density function gx. Therefore, in this case, the government will recognize that if it tried to implement the rst-best solution, the enforcer would have incentives to overstate her his costs to obtain a rent. Hence, in designing an optimal law enforcement policy, the government is restricted to make contracts menu contingent o n v ariables that are veri able and observable to both parties, say the probability of enforcement.
The revelation principal states that the government can restrict its attention to the class of mechanisms in response to which the enforcement agency reports his her type truthfully. The government o ers the self-selection mechanism, a menu of type-revealing contract in px and tx that the enforcer can choose among: M = hx 2 ; p x ; t x i De ne: U x = t x , C x; px 8x 2 U x; x = t x ,C x; p x 8x 2 where U x; x is the rent of type x whenx is reported, and U x = U x; x when she he reports truthfully. Recalling that social welfare is: where the rst term refers to surplus of o enses, the second term to social cost of enforcement, and the third term to the cost of rent left to the agency. Under symmetric information, the enforcer does not obtain a rent since U x = 0; there is no social cost of information rent. However, under asymmetric information, we will see that we must allow a positive rent to the agent in order to obtain a truthfully cost report.
The government problem is now to maximize in p, t and The information rent given by i is decreasing in x, i.e. to be willing to reveal their true type, more cost e ective enforcers must be rewarded with a higher rent than less cost e ective enforcers. Moreover, from the monotonicity condition ii we can say that less cost e ective enforcers provide a lower level of enforcement in order to extract a rent since: The enforcement problem is now reduced to maximizing expected social welfare subject to the monotonicity constraint p 0 x 0 and the maximal ne constraint. We will ignore the monotonicity constraint at rst, and show that the solution to the less constrained problem satis es it:
Proposition 3 Under asymmetric information, the optimal enforcement policy is given bỹ pxS = h , 1 + @ C x;p=@p + = S f pS where
The optimal probabilitypx is found by pointwise di erentiation of the expected social welfare with respect to px and s such that 0 s S.
It remains to show that the solution satis es the monotonicity condition x is the sign of , x which is negative due to assumptions A.2, A.4, and A.5:
By comparing with the solution to the symmetric information, we see that asymmetry of information generates a new term -the marginal information cost for all types x x-giving lower enforcement for all types. The interpretation of the optimal policy is: the marginal bene t from deterrence in terms of avoided harm equals the social marginal cost adjusted to deterring crime plus the marginal cost of rent-seeking adjusted to deterring crime plus the expected sanction.
The explanation for this distortion in px is that it makes less favorable for more cost e ective enforcers to mimic less cost e ective enforcers. Indeed, when the government reduces the intensity of enforcement, an enforcer of type x nds it less favorable to mimic enforcerx x . Choosingp: l o w er than the rst-best level p : however implies a sub-optimal enforcement level. The government faces a trade-o between minimizing the enforcer's information rent U x and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts.
Example
In order to compare with the usual models of the theory of optimal law enforcement, consider F b uniform on b 2 0; 1 , with h 1 and f : = 1, and consider Cx; p = xp with x 2 . Therefore, we re-write: 
Proof
The degree of underdeterrence is given by h , pxf . We can derive that: p ,pS = Gx=gx =S For 0, it is clear that the degree of underdeterrence is higher when there is asymmetry of information because of the information rent. 2
We have already shown that because enforcement is costly, at the optimum, there is underdeterrence, that is, the expected sanction is less than the harm borne by victims. The degree of underdeterrence augments with asymmetry of information because enforcement is more costly in such context given that an information rent must be paid.
Consequently, under asymmetry of information, the Becker result is reinforced. As the sanction increases, the degree of underdeterrence becomes less important. In the limit case, when the severity of punishment approaches innite and the probability of punishment approaches zero, the fact that there is asymmetry of information is not very meaningful. In the usual Polinsky and Shavell 1999 model, raising public funds is costless. Consequently, asymmetry of information between the government and public enforcers is not an interesting issue. It does not a ect the optimal policy; it only has a distribution role by increasing the share of enforcers at the expense of the government's share of criminal surplus. For a utilitarian government the optimal policy is neutral to such redistribution.
De nex as the maximal cost parameter acceptable for the government to hire an agency of type x as an enforcer that is,p x S= 0: Proof For = 0 raising public funds is costless, we h a v e thatx = hS whereas for 0 w e havex h S from 5.2
Enforcers of typex x hS are hired within a symmetric information story but not in a context of asymmetric information. The motivation is that enforcers have to be deterred from imitating less cost e ective agencies by paying an information rent. By reducing the upper bound on acceptable enforcement costs, the government reduces the cost of an information rent. The consequence is that the least cost e ective agency in a context of asymmetric information is more e ective than the least cost e ective agency in a context of symmetric information. On average, the agencies are more cost e ective in a context of asymmetry rather than symmetry of information.
Conclusion
This paper has extended the theory of optimal law enforcement to the case of asymmetry of information between the government and the public enforcement agency. We have shown that such asymmetry of information a ects negatively the probability o f apprehension and punishment and hence positively the proportion of o enses committed as long as raising public funds is costly. This paper is directly related to the literature that discusses the advantages of using private enforcement, in particular Polinsky 1980 and Shavell 1993 . A private enforcement agency chooses the probability of apprehension and punishment whereas a public enforcement agency simply complies with the probability set by the government. A private enforcer manipulates apprehension and detection to increase pro ts naturally does not seek to deter o enses completely. A public enforcer manipulates the cost of complying with the probability set by the government to increase the information rent.
In a world where raising public funds is costless, we have shown that asymmetry of information between the government and enforcers does not a ect the optimal policy. Consequently, w e point out that public enforcement is preferred to private enforcement since, as Polinsky 1980 has shown, the private enforcer might choose a lower than optimal probability even when the government o ers a large reward.
When raising public funds is costly, both private and public enforcement lead to a probability of apprehension and punishment di erent from the optimal one. Depending on the information rent, on one hand, and the private reward and market structure 5 , on the other hand, we can nd that private enforcement could be superior to public enforcement.
